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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the extent to which equity requires a bank to account for its 
participation in a breach of trust or fiduciary duty. The application of the Barnes v Addy 
' knowing assistance' and 'kno°"'ing receipt ' categories of liability to the banking situation 
is discussed, with the current uncertainties, particularly in knowing receipt, highlighted. 
The paper also addresses the notion that Barnes v Addy jurisprudence may soon be 
obsolete, following the decision of the House of Lords in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale, 
and the Privy Council's advice in Royal Bnmei Airlines v Tan. Accordingly, some 
thoughts on the future development of accessory and receipt based liability, and the 
possible implications for banks, are provided. Throughout, the position is taken that 
although banks should be encouraged to take steps to eliminate fraudulent transactions, 
the efficiency of banking business should not be unduly sacrificed by equity's efforts to 
protect the interests of individual beneficiaries. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and annexures) 
comprises approximately 14 500 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The financial disaster of the late 1980's has served to highlight issues which concern the 
distribution of losses upon the collapse of corporate entities and individual dealers. 
Where financial ruin has occurred, the catalysts for losses vary:
1 
Fraud, theft and incompetence, the abdication of professional responsibility and regulatory 
failure, misplaced trust and self-interested complacency are all elements in the explanations 
investors, depositors, financiers and creditors are now receiving of the causes of their plight. 
Where fraud or managerial impropriety has occurred, individuals will have been deprived 
of legitimate interests. The innocent victim is entitled to a remedy. Unfortunately, the 
primary wrongdoer is often not worth pursuing for economic reasons. Consequently, 
"the courts are increasingly concerned with attempts by the victims of fraud to trace their 
money and recover it, not from the fraudsters or their confederates, who have usually 
disappeared, but from those through whose hands it has passed. "
2 
Inevitably, where funds have been misdirected, banks and other intermediaries will be 
implicated in the losses which have been suffered. Often, it will be through their hands 
that money has passed, or even remained. When combined with the 'deep pockets' of a 
bank, an attractive defendant is created. Hence, banks find themselves subject to victims' 
attempts to include them in the wrongdoing of another. 
This paper addresses situations where the victim of fraud or mismanagement is a 
beneficiary under a trust or fiduciary relationship. In other words, those situations where 
the principles of equity must be invoked to aid those deprived of financial interests. 
Equity must define when third parties (such as a bank) have become implicated in 
primary wrongdoing to such a degree that they should be liable to account to the victim. 
1 PD Firm "The Liability ofThird Parties for Knowing Receipt or Assistance" in D WM Waters (ed) 
Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts 1993 (Corswell, Ontario, 1993) 195. 
2 P J Millett ''Tracing the Proceeds of Fraud" (1991) 107 LQR 71, 71. 
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There are a variety of competing issues at stake:3 
How far is the law to go in creating a new class of insurers against corporate 
mismanagement and managerial impropriety?.. . Are liability rules to be skewed towards 
deep pockets? ... And, perhaps most fundamentally, is the law to embrace rules on risk 
assumption and risk allocation which depart from what should reasonably be attributed to 
the various parties and actors who come together in business associations and dealings? 
The nature of banking business necessarily influences the risks which should be imposed 
upon banks by the courts. There is a difficult balance to be struck. On one side, a bank's 
reluctance to inquire into customer affairs contributes to the ease and speed with which a 
fraud can be perpetrated.4 On the other, the sheer magnitude of banking transactions 
dictate against any inquiry. An efficient system is required if banks are to process the vast 
numbers of daily transactions which are placed before it. Computerisation is essential to 
this task. Consequently, the opportunities for a bank to make inquiries into the integrity 
of a particular transaction are limited. 
At present, equity's response to this conundrum is found within the rules on strangers as 
constructive trustees. These rules provide the basis for determining a bank's liability to 
account to those who have been illegitimately deprived of equitable interests. Before 
introducing these rules, it is desirable to provide a brief overview of basic banking law 
principles. 
II BANKING PRINCIPLES 
The fundamental legal principle which underlies banking practice was enunciated by Lord 
Cottenham LC in Foley v Hil/: 5 
Money, when paid into a bank, ceases altogether to be the money of the customer; it is then 
the money of the banker, who is boW1d to return an equivalent by paying a similar sum to 
that deposited with him when he is asked for it. ... The money placed in the custody of a 
banker is to all intents and purposes the money of the banker, to do with it as he pleases. 
3 Above n 1, 195. 
4 Above n 2, 71. 
5 (1848) [1843] All ER Rep 16, 19. 
6 
Hence, a bank is not trustee for the money it holds to the credit of its customer. The 
bank is a mere debtor, and is free to use the money a" its own, subject only to the 
customer's right to repayment.
6 
The same principle app!ies when the depositor is a trustee. The bank does not become a 
trustee itself, but remains a simple debtor. The trustee is a creditor, who may claim the 
debt on behalf of the beneficiaries. 
7 Again, the bank is free to use the money deposited to 
pursue its own interests. 
Consequently, a bank is generally not obliged to inquire into the source of customer 
funds, or ''to pay heed to tht.: claims of third parties seeking to reach it in his hands as 
being by right theirs. "
8 Furtheimore, the bank has no r1;;sponsibility to supervise or check 
the managerial activities of its customers. 
Being rules of general application, they are inevitably subject to exceptions. The special 
circumstances of a relationship with its customer may require that specific obligations be 
placed upon the bank. In particular, a bank may be held liable to account as constructive 
trustee. 
ill S1RANGERS AS CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTEES 
The modem foundation for the law on strangers as constructive trustees is Lord 
Selbome's often cited statement in Barnes v Addy:9 
[S]trangers are not to be made constructive trustees merely because they act as agents of 
trustees in transactions within their legal powers, transactions, perhaps of which a Court of 
Equity may disapprove, unless [they] receive and become chargeable with some part of the 
trust property, or unless they assist with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on 
the part of the trustees. 
The vast body of case law and academic literature which has emanated from this 
proposition creates problems for those who try to discern consistency in this area. 
Professor Rickett aptly describes the situation:
10 
6 M Megrah and F Ryder Paget 's Law of Banking (9 ed, Butterworths, London, 1982) 83. 
7 W F Pratcher Scott on Trusts (4 ed, Little BroMl & Co, Boston, 1987) § 527. 
8 Above n 6, 83. 
9 (1874)9ChApp244,25l. 
1° C E F Rickett "Strangers as Constructive Trustees in New Zealand" (1~91) 11 OJLS 598, 600. 
'Tilere has been an extraordinary amow1t of confll5ion i.J1 tJ1e cases, compow1ded by any 
number of different refinements by academic commentators, concerning both the basic 
philosophy and tJ1e detailed rules oflaw relatmg to strangers as constructive trustees. 
7 
Indeed, the ''voluminous and highly technical literature'' and international case law can be 
described as ''Babel-like" .11 Much of the inconsistency is due to past inclinations to apply 
Lord Selbome 's statement literally, 12 Furthermore, it has been suggested that the 
judiciary has failed to take account of the wide range of circumstances in which a 
participant in a breach of trust has been held liable in the past. Instead, the focus has 
been on the Barnes v Addy categories, which resulted in principles from conceptually 
distinct categmies being assimilated into Lord Selbome's classes of liability. 13 However, 
the impressive amount of discussion over recent years on strangers as constructive 
trustees has lead to the acceptance that '"the words of Lord Selbome LC merely express a 
principle which was to be applicable in the case before the Court. "14 Indeed, the validity 
of the Barnes v Addy jurisprudence is being questioned, with increased demands for its 
abandonment. 15 As will become clear by the end of this paper: the law is on the verge of 
achieving this. 
Despite the criticisms of the Barnes v Addy jurisprudence, the two broad categories of 
liability from Lord Selbome' s judgement are still in frequent use. 16 'Knowing assistance ' 
or 'accessory liability' concentrates on the conduct of the defendant, and his or her 
facilitation of the hreach of tmst. Here; the tmstee terminology is misle::iciing. A h::ink is 
not liable due to a breach of any constructive trustee obligations - there is simply a 
personal liability to account for the loss caused by the wrongful acl. 
The rationale for 'knowing receipt or dealing' liability is debatable, One view suggests 
the unconscionable conduct of the defendant remains in issue, Alternatively, liability 
11 Above n l, 196. 
12 See Lord Nicholls m Royal Bnmei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan (1995] 3 WLR 64, 70: "there has been a 
tendency to cite and interpret and apply Lord Selborne's formulation in Barnes v Addy as though it were a 
statute." 
13 C Harpum "The Basis of Equitable Liability" m P Birks (ed) The Frontiers of Liability (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1994) 9. 
14 Per Greig Jin Cigna Life Insurance New Zealand Ltd v Westpac Securities Ltd [1996] 1 NZLR 80, 85. 
15 See generally above n l ; above n 13. 
16 This is the case in New 2.ealand, England and Australia. As Finn notes in above n 1, 198: Canada and 
the United States do not draw such a sharp distinction between assistance and receipt. Professor Finn 
would prefer to see a general participatory liability scheme, with the same rules applying to assistance and 
receipt: above n 1, 212. See C Harpurn above n 13 for a more refined discussion of the various categories 
of equitable liability which have been recognized in equity. 
8 
could be restitution based, concerned with negating the recipient's unjust enrichment. If 
the former view is accepted as correct, knowing assistance and knowing receipt are simply 
different heads of liability. If the latter view is adopted, knowing assistance and knowing 
receipt are two entirely distinct categories of liability. This debate will be returned to 
later. 
Whichever rationale for knowing receipt is accepted, the constructive trust terminology 
remains deceptive. The defendant does not claim title to or rights over specific property. 
The claim i~ for value received, and if successful, results in the imposition of a personal 
obligation to repay. 
17 
IV BANKS AS STRA,.""l"GERS 
There is a peculiar overlap between the two limbs of Eames v Addy for banks and other 
intennediaries, since it may be a matter of controversy as to when such an intermediary has 
received a sufficiently lasting or permanent benefit from the property of others ( which it 
handles in the ordinary course of business) that it can be said to fall within the first limb 
rather than the second limb.
18 
There are two extremes of participation in a breach of trust. At one end of the scale, the 
defendant receives the funds and retains them. At the other extreme, the defendant is a 
party to the breach, but does not come into possession of funds, and receives no benefit. 
19 
Tn nr:w.tir.e: :i h:ink te:nnc;: to fall he:twe:e:n the:c;:e: two e:".>.--tre:me:,;: ;:i,;: it :ilmo,;:t :ilw:iv~ he:r.ome:" -- r .... ---...- -, - ___ ... --- ... - ....... ----- ..... - .... - _.._ ... _ .. _...,_ ......... _ ........... --... ·--· ··- ..... -- ..... -... ..... .. - .... -.1 .... _. - - ..., ......... _ ...., 
implicated in fraud by dealing with funds in its possession. 
A The Bank as Recipient 
Due to the nature and diversity of services offered by banks, the risk of constructive 
trustee liability can arise in a variety of circumstances. Usually, the bank is implicated 
because the trust property has appeared in its ·hands. However, this does not imply that 
liability is receipt-based, as banks frequently act in the course of agency. Lord Selborne 
17 One commentator labels this as "proprietary recovery of value". See J Glover ''Equity, Restitution and 
the Proprietary Recovery of Value" (1991) 14 UNSW Law Jnl 247,247: "Proprietary recovery of value 
refers to a certain measure of recovery of non-specific interests in property, usually money. It does not 
refer to the recovery of any property in specie and is not the enforcement of title to, or rights over, any 
particular thing or monetary denomination." 
18 G Weaver and C Craigie The Law Relating to Banker and Customer in Australia (Law Book Co, 
Sydney, 1990) 3149 at para 7.540. 
19 See above n 14, 86; Nimmo v Westpac Banking Corporation [1993] 3 NZLR 219,224. 
9 
was fully aware of the need to protect agents, but nevertheless recognized that an agent 
could "receive and become chargeable" with trust property. The difficulty lies in defining 
when an agent becomes chargeable with property received. 
Sir Clifford Richmond proposed the following threshold in Westpac Banking 
Corporation v Savin:20 
So it can be argued that an agent who receives trust funds from the trustee will be within the 
[!mowing receipt] category only ifhe is setting up a title of his own to the funds which he 
has received and is not acting as a mere depository or, ... merely a channel through which 
money is passed to other persons. 
Other cases have employed different terminology to describe the same effect. In Nimmo 
v Westpac Banking Corporation, where a transfer of moneys overseas followed by the 
issue of bank cheques and travellers cheques was in question, it was thought the bank 
"was in no better position as a result of the transaction. "21 Transaction fees were not a 
material consideration. 
In Cigna Life Insurance New Zealand Ltdv Westpac Securities Ltd, Greig J noted that a 
trading bank uses customer money as part of its stock-in-trade to make a profit. 
Nevertheless, in the constructive trustee situation "it is right to treat a trading bank 
defendant as merely a depository or channel through which the moneys are transferred. "22 
It must be shown that the bank retains the money as creditor, or in some other way for its 
own use or benefit. 
Accordingly, the paying or collecting bank will not usually be within the knowing receipt 
category. The prevalent situation where a bank 'sets up a title of its own' to funds is 
when it receives monies into an overdrawn account, and thereby retains them as 
creditor. 23 
20 [1985] 2 NZLR 41, 69. 
21 Above n 19,224. 
22 Above n 14, 87. 
23 See Richardson J in Westpac Banking Corporation v Savin above 20, 52: ''in accepting the cheque and 
crediting it against the customer's private overdraft it is advancing its personal interest in the transaction." 
He uses wording to similar effect in Westpac Banking Corporation v Ancell (1993) 4 NZBLC 103,269, 
103,270. 
9 
2 
d 
10 
Although the initial receipt of funds may be insufficient to establish receipt based liability, 
the bank's later dealing with those funds could be. If a bank receives a benefit from 
dealing in a manner inconsistent with the trust, "liability is clearly receipt based". 
24 A 
plain example is where a bank purports to set-off an account in debit against an account 
in credit which contains trust funds. 
In Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson, 
25 Millett J indicated that inconsistent dealing is distinct 
from 'knowing receipt'. The distinguishing factor is that the "stranger receives trust 
property in circumstances in which he is not in consequence of that receipt a constructive 
trustee. "26 Furthermore, liability is not necessarily linked to any wrongdoing by the 
trustee, as the bank may act through its own volution. 
27 
Lankshear v ANZ Banldng Group (New Zealand) Ltcf-8 is thought to provide an example 
of 'inconsistent dealing'. The bank's customer had formed a partnership with the 
plaintiff. The bank knew the plaintiff had advanced funds to the partnership for a specific 
purpose. The application of those funds to reduce the customer's overdraft with the bank 
was inconsistent with the specific purpose it was provided for. Accordingly, there was a 
breach of fiduciary duty. 
Wallace J decided that the bank received the money knowing it was subject to a trust, and 
then dealt with it in a manner inconsistent with the trust.
29 However, it is questionable 
whether the inconsistent dealing analysis provides a proper basis for liability in thi<, case.
30 
The bank was not acting as an agent. It pressured its customer to apply the funds to the 
overdrawn account, and was asserting a title of its own to the funds. The ' inconsistent 
dealing' category applies where the funds are initially received in a ministeti.al capacity -
where the bank is acting as agent for the fiduciary.31 It is difficult to see why this was not 
treated as a simple knowing receipt case. 
Whether a distinction between the knowing receipt and the inconsistent dealing categories 
is necessary can be queried. As soon as a benefit is retained through dealing, it would 
seem a defendant is in the same position as one who retained a benefit from the outset. 
24 C E F Rickett " When is a Bank Liable for Receipt in Equity?" [1995] NZLJ 78, 79. 
25 
[ 1990] Ch 265, 291. 
26 Above n 13, 20. 
71 Above n 1,209. 
28 [1993] 1 NZLR481. 
29 C Harpum uses Lankshear to illustrate that ' inconsistent dealing includes: " A banker who receives 
money for a client knowing that he is under a fiduciary obligation to apply it for a specific purpose and 
then applies it in discharge ofhis overdraft.": above n 13, 20. 
30 See C E F Rickett "Banks as 'Stranger' Constructive Trustees: Two High Court Decisions [1992] NZLJ 
366,367. 
31 Above n 13, 20. 
Fwthermore, the authorities suggest the knowledge required for liability as an inconsistent 
dealer is the same as a knowing recipient. 32 However, if the bank has dealt inconsistently 
of its own accord, an analogy with common law conversion indicates liability could be 
strict.33 
Essentially, receipt based claims encompass those situations where a bank's debt is 
reduced through the misapplication of trust moneys. In Westpac Banking Corporation v 
Savin, Sir Clifford Richmond thought it indisputable that "a banker who receives trnst 
funds in reduction of the private overdrawn account of the trustee is in the same position 
as any other creditor.. .. "34 \\,'hen the bank receives money as creditor, it is explicit in Sir 
Clifford's judgement that its status as banker is irrelevant. The bank will be treated in the 
same way as any other commercial entity which receives funds in breach of trust. The 
apparent generality of this proposition will be considered in more detail later. 
B The Bank as Ass;stor 
A 'knowing assistance' claim will usually ensue when a bank, in honouring its customer's 
instructions, has facilitated a breach of trust. The simplest case is where a bank honours a 
customer cheque which is drawn on trust funds for an improper purpose. In modem 
times international transfers accomplished by electronic means are more likely to be in 
issue. The facts of Nimmo v Westpac Banking Corporation35 provide a pertinent 
example. The bank's customer was a fraudster who embezzled monies from Mr Nimmo. 
He did this by placing Mr Nimmo' s money into a trust account at the bank. This enabled 
a foreign currency exchange, which was credited to a different account upon completion. 
The customer then proceeded with a scheme whereby the money was transferred to an 
overseas account, upon which a cheque was drawn to facilitate the collection of bank 
cheques and travellers cheques. In following,the customer's instructions, the bank found 
itself subject to a 'knowing assistance' claim by Mr Nimmo. 
32 Above n 13, 20. 
33 Above n 1, 209. 
34 Above n 20, 69. 
35 Above n 19. 
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V THE 'KNOWLEDGE' REQUIRED TO FIX LIABIUTY 
Given that a bank has become implicated in primary wrongdoing by the trustee or 
fiduciary, it remains to determined when secondary liability will attach to the bank. Since 
equity acts on the conscience, the bank's state of mind provides the touchstone for 
liability. However, equity is also sensitive to the various press~es which exist in the 
banking environment. The result is a body of case law which has endeavotrred to 
determine an appropriate level of knowledge which is sufficient to fix liability. 
A The Categories of 'Knowledge ' 
I The development of knowledge 
In Westpac Banking Corporation v Savin,x, the Com1 of Appeal adopted the famous 
dicta of Peter Gibson J in Baden, Delvaux and Lecuit v Societe General pour Favoriser 
le Developpement du Commerce et de l'lndustrie en France SA ,31 where knowledge was 
cast into five categories: 
( 1 )actual knowledge 
(2) knowledge which is obtainable but for shutting one' s eyes to the obvious 
(3) knowledge obtainable but for wilfully and recklessly failing to make such inquiries as 
an honest and reasonable person would make 
( 4) knowledge of cir cum.stances which would indicate the facis to an honest and 
reasonable person 
(5) knowledge obtainable from inquities which an honest and reasonable person would 
feel obliged to make, being put on inquiry as a result of his or her knowledge of 
suspicious circumstances. 
The Baden classification has been treated with hostility by academics. Arguably, it 
contributes to the application of law which is ·'often technical to the point of the artificial 
and the arcane".38 However, the Baden scale has often provided the bedrock for judicial 
decision making in this area of the law.
39 In Westpac Ban/...'ing Corporation v Savin, 
36 Above n 20. 
37 [1983] BCLC 325. 
38 Above n 1, 196. 
39 Professor Rickett comments that the " categorisation seems to have become an almost quasi-legislative 
fixture in New Zealand cases on this subject": above n 30, 367. 
13 
Richardson J began the discussion of knowledge by extracting relevant principles from 
the case law, with tenn.s such as "cognizant" and "reason to believe" being emphasized.40 
In hindsight, the reliance on Baden without fu1ther explanation contributed to the 
subsequent lack of principled analysis of the underlying basis of stranger liability. 41 
Peter Gibson J posited that all five categories were relevant to receipt and assistance 
liability, but only rarely would category (5) type knowledge be imputed to agents such as 
a banks who follow customer instructions.42 The New Zealand cases have tended to draw 
a line between the first three and last two categories, depending on the type of liability in 
issue.43 The rationale is that the first three categories are indicative of dishonesty,44 while 
the final two amount to carelessness only. 
By comparison, in the High Court of Australia it was thought that a failure to infer could 
be equated with actual knowledge, but a careless but innocent failure to inquire could 
not. 45 It was considered unjust to allow a defendant to escape liability due to his or her 
obtuseness. 
InAgip (Africa) Ltdv Jackson, 46 Millett J maintained that a negligent failure to infer is 
not equivalent to actual knowledge, as no dishonesty is involved. However, he proceeded 
to impute dishonesty by inference, due to a lack of evidence relating to the defendant's 
actual state of mind.47 In Eagle Trust Pie v SBC Securities Ltd Vinelott J viewed the 
matter in the following way:48 
If the circumstances are such that an honest and reasonable man would have appreciated 
that he was assisting in a dishonest breach of trust, the court may infer from the defendant's 
silence that he either appreciated the fact or that he wilfully shut his eyes to the obvious or 
wilfully and recklessly failed to make inquiries for fear of what he might learn. 
40 Above n 20, 51. The relevant authority was Thomson v Clydesdale Bank Ltd [1893] AC 282. 
41 See above n 30, 366. 
42 See the discussion in Westpac Banking Corporation v Savin above n 20, 53. 
43 See for example Equitico,p Industries Group Ltd v Hawkins [1991] 3 NZLR 700; Springfield Acres 
Ltd (in liq) v Abacus (Hong Kong) Ltd [1994] 3 NZLR 502. 
44 See above n 25, 293:"[ s ]uch conduct is dishonest, and those who are guilty of it cannot complain if, for 
the purposes of civil liability, they are treated as if they had actual knowledge". 
45 ConsulDevelopmentPtyLtdv DPC Estates PtyLtd (1975) 132 CLR 373, 398 per Gibbs J; 412 per 
Stephen J. 
46 Above n 25, 293. 
47 Above n 25, 294. 
48 [1993] 1 WLR 484,494. The statements were made in the context of a knowing assistance case. 
e 
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Millett J would allow a defendant to rebut the inference of knowledge by showing 
'foolishness', so that wrongdoing was not comprehended. Vinelott J leaves open the 
question whether a defendant can show ignorance of wrongdoing due to "inexperience or 
because he was unusually or umeasoruibly ousting, or for some other reason". 
49 
However, in the case of a commercial entity, and in particular a bank, "it will not be a 
happy experience ... to seek to rebut an inference of knowledge by pleading that it was too 
foolish to perceive the reasoruibly perceptible. "
50 Unfortunately for banks, this may well 
be what is required, for if a reasoruible banker would have appreciated a breach of trust, 
"the court, in the absence of explanation, might find a want of probity on the part of the 
~ · l ,,51 pro.1ess1orui . . . . 
Following the Privy Council's advice that knowledge "is inapt as a criterion", 
52 and that 
the "Baden scale of knowledge is best forgotten", 
53 it seems the appropriate distinction is 
between a bank which has acted dishonestly, and one which carelessly fails to inquire into 
a suspicious transaction. 
2 Dishonesty 
The definition of dishonesty was consolidated by the Privy Council in Royal Brunei 
Airlines Sdn Bhdv Tan. 54 Their Lordc;hips were clear that dishonesty ''means simply not 
acting as an honest person would in the circumstances. 
55 This is clearly objective, and 
says that every person will be imputed with the same moral standards as the reasonable 
person. An individual "will not escape a finding of dishonesty simply because he sees 
nothing wrong in such behaviour. "
56 
However, dishonesty describes conduct "assessed in the light of what a person actually 
knew at the time, as distinct from what a reasonable person would have known or 
appreciated. "57 Furthermore, it is proper to "have regard to personal attributes of the 
49 Above n 48, 484. 
50 S Gardner "Knowing Assistance and Knowing Receipt: Taking Stock" (1996) 112 LQR 56, 60. 
51 L Aitkin "The Solicitor as Constructive Trustee" (1993) 67 ALJ 4, 8. 
52 Above n 12, 75. 
53 Above n 12, 76. 
54 Above n 12. Noted in C Harpurn "Accessory Liability for Procuring or Assisting a Breach ofTrust" 
(1995) 111 LQR 545. 
55 Above n 12, 73. 
56 Above n 12, 73. 
57 Above n 12, 73. 
[ defendant], such as his experience and intelligence, and the reason why he acted as he 
did. "58 The overall test of dishonesty is succinctly described as follows: 59 
[D]oes the honest person regard it as honest to behave as the defendant did - that behaviour 
being defined by reference not merely to the external effects of the defendant' s actions, but 
also to the motives and attitudes with which the defendant performed those actions? 
15 
In most cases, the answer will be clear. However, situations will arise where there is 
genuine doubt as to the legitimacy of a proposed transaction. This is the bank's dilemma 
personified, as usually it will not know for certain whether a transaction is legitimate or 
not. Lord Nicholls observed that is was impossible to be more specific than to say that an 
"individual is expected to attain the standard which would be observed by an honest 
person placed in those circumstances. "60 
Does this mean that on some occasions an honest banker is entitled to ignore a risk of 
fraud? As has been discussed earlier, a bank faces daunting commercial pressure, which 
may encourage it to surpass inquiry where the risk of impropriety is small. In such a case, 
a court might be persuaded that the bank has maintained an honest standard. Lord 
Nicholls suggests that:61 
An honest person would have regard to the circumstances known to him, including the 
nature and importance of the proposed transaction, the nature and importance of his role, 
the ordinary course of business, the degree of doubt, the practicability of the trustee or the 
third party proceeding otherwise and the seriousness of the adverse consequences to the 
beneficiaries. 
Invariably, questions of fact and degree will be involved, and it will be difficult to 
designate an appropriate threshold. 
3 Constructive notice 
Put simply, the dishonesty doctrine asserts that a bank has actual knowledge of the breach 
of trust if it acts dishonestly. Constructive notice on the other hand refers to the standards 
of the reasonable person. 
58 Above n 12, 74. 
59 Above n 50, 66. 
60 Above n 12, 74. 
61 Above n 12, 74. 
15 
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There is a natural reluctance to resort to constructive notice, as it has traditionally been 
excluded from the commercial arena. Constmctive notice is usually associated with land 
• 62 conveyancmg: 
In dealing with estates in land title is everything, and can be leisurely investigated; in 
commercial transactions possession is everything, and there is no time to investigate title; 
and ifwe were to extend the doctrine of constructive notice to commercial transactions we 
should be doing infinite mischief and paralysing the trade of the country. 
This view has not been challenged. Notice will always have its own meaning in the land 
conveyancing context.63 However, this does not bar notice being given a different 
meaning in different contexts. One possible interpretation is to confine constructive 
notice in the commercial arena to facts which were actually discovered.
64 The alternative, 
and perhaps more logical approach is to include matters which the reasonable person 
would have discovered, and to allow latitude for the notion that a reasonable person is 
less meticulous in the commercial environment. Such is the approach propounded by 
Millet Jin Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust Plc:
65 
In order to establish constructive notice it is necessary to prove that the facts known to the 
defendant made it imperative for him to seek an explanation, because in the absence of an 
explanation it was obvious that the transaction was probably improper. 
The generality of this statement belies the inherent difficulties in establishing when a 
bank's failure to make inquiry into the legitimacy of a transaction is unreasonable. In 
Nimmo v Westpac Banking Corporation, Blanchard J identified two ways in which this 
issue could be approached. 6
6 
Firstly, the bank's internal instructions with respect to a certain type of transaction could 
be deficient. In Nimmo, expert evidence suggested that the bank's instructions to staff fell 
62 Manchester Trost v Furness [1895] 2 QB 539, 545. 
63 A person has notice of a fact if a reasonable person would have discovered it, "and the reasonable 
person has been treated as highly perceptive, businesslike to the point of suspicious, and prepared to go to 
very considerable lengths in his search for the truth": above n 50, 60. 
64 Above n 48,494. For an example where a bank was found to have ' actual' notice, see Stephens Travel 
Service v Qantas (1988) 13 NSWLR 331. As noted above (see text at n 48), if the reasonable person in 
possession of those facts would have appreciated that a breach of trust was being committed, the judge 
may infer that the defendant did also. 
65 [1995) 1 VlLR978, 1000. SeealsoEIAjouvDollarLandHoldingsPic[l993J3AllER 717,739. 
66 Above n 19, 228. It should be noted that Blanchard J had already decided that negligence was not 
enough to fix liability in the knowing assistance category. The findings of negligence merely illustrated 
that dishonesty was not present. 
short of reasonable banking standards, which contributed to a finding that the failure to 
make inquiry was negligent. Similarly, in Dairy Containers Ltd v NZ! Bank Ltd, 67 '"the 
essence" of the defendant bank's negligence was the failure to enforce a satisfactory 
system to deal with the type of transaction in question. 68 In both cases, the plain risk of 
fraudulent action in that type of transaction predicated the need for an effective 
procedure. 
17 
Alternatively, it can be argued that if an employee fails to follow a bank's internal 
direction to inquire, a finding of negligence should follow. However, it must be realized 
that a "bank's failure to follow its internal instructions is not conclusive evidence of 
negligence. "69 Such regulations do provide a useful guide, and may amount to persuasive 
evidence pointing to negligence. 
The second way in which a failure to inquire could be found unreasonable is by 
examining the specific circumstances surrounding the transaction. This is when the 
application of constructive notice is most controversial. 
The law has perpetually struggled in its attempts to draw a line between the countervailing 
policy considerations. In Gray v Johnston, Lord Cairns recognized that:7° 
On the one hand, it would be a most serious matter if bankers were to be allowed, on light 
and trifling grounds - on wounds of mere suspicion or curiosity - to refuse to honour a 
cheque drawn by their customer... . On the other hand, it would equally of serious moment 
if bankers were to be allowed to shelter themselves under that title, and to say that they were 
at liberty to become parties or privies to a breach of trust. 
The consequences of a bank's special contractual duties with respect to customer 
instructions were summarized and accepted as correct by Alliott J in Lipkin Gorman v 
Karpnale:71 
67 [1994] MCLR 465. There, ANZ Bank had pleaded s 5(1) of the Cheques Act 1960 as a defence to a 
claim for conversion of cheques. The bank was required to show that it acted without negligence when 
collecting payment of the cheques. 
68 Above n 67, 565. 
69 Above n 67, 566. 
70 (1868) LR 3 HL 1, 11. 
71 [1987] 1 WLR 987. 
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• A banker is entitled to treat a customer's mandate at face value 
• The bank is not obliged to question a transaction which is in accordance with the 
mandate, unless a reasonable banker would have grounds for inquiry 
• If no reasonable grounds appear, the banker must pay 
• Suspicion and unease on the part of the bank ic; not enough to deny payment 
• The bank is not an amateur detective. 
The bank's contractual obligations owed to its customer are not the sole concern, as "the 
law should not impose too burdensome an obligation on bankers, which hampers the 
effective transacting of banking business unnecessarily. "
72 When combined, such 
considerations dictate against a duty of inquiry which obliges a bank to be overly 
meticulous or suspicious in dealing with its customer's instructions. The practical position 
is summarized as follows:
73 
The decision to honour or dishonour a customer' s cheques is usually regarded as the classic 
commercial situation where there is a need for legal principle which recognizes the time 
pressure involved, and the orthodox contractual duty is to pay promptly unless there is a 
real or serious possibility that [ another party] might be thereby defrauded. 
Even where the bank receives funds as creditor, authority suggests there is no stringent 
duty to inquire. The applicable legal principle was enunciated by Lord Herschell LC in 
Thomson v Clydesdale Bank Ltd:74 
It cannot, I think, be questioned that under ordinary circumstances a person, be he banker 
or other, who takes money from his debtor in discharge of a debt is not bound to inquire 
into the manner in which the person so paying the debt acquired the money with which he 
pays it. 
Accordingly, it would seem that a reasonable'banker would only find inquiry necessary if 
there was a real likelihood of fraud. Therefore, courts should be cautious in assessing the 
circumstances in which a reasonable acquirer of funds should be put on inquiry.
75 
The 
facts must be sufficient to arouse more than a mere suspicion of impropriety. For 
72 Per Steyn Jin Barclays Bank pie v Quincecare Ltd (1988) [1992] 4 All ER 363,376. 
73 Above n 18, 3153 at para 7.550. 
74 Above n 40, 282. 
75 PG Watts "Restitution" [1995) NZ Law Rev 395, 403. 
example, in Westpac Banking Corporation v Nimmo, a withdrawal from a trust account 
in the equivalent of cash, which was at the disposal of a single director, was sufficient to 
put the bank on inquiry.76 
Perhaps the best approach to the problem was recognized by Knox J:77 
In my judgement it may well be that the underlying broad principle which runs through the 
authorities regarding commercial transactions is that the court will impute knowledge, on 
the basis of what a reasonable person would have learnt, to a person who is guilty of 
commerci.ally unacceptable conduct in the particular context involved. 
This statement seems to capture the spirit of equity's role in the commercial environmen 
Equity regulates standards of conduct in commercial relationships and dealings by acting 
on the conscience of the parties involved. 78 Of course, this does not mean equity will 
interfere simply because a particular outcome seems unfair to one party. The facts must 
present a manifestly unjust situation. Sometimes, a bank's conduct may be such that 
constructive notice is enough to fix liability for participation in a breach of trust, while 
other situations require dishonesty before good conscience requires the bank to account 
for its actions. An holistic approach to the problem could be advocated. No single and 
inflexible test for the level of knowledge required would be appropriate to establish 
liability. The role the bank played, and the particular circumstances of the case would 
dictate the knowledge required to fix liability.79 
However, modem case law favours the Barnes v Addy distinction, which necessitates a 
somewhat rigid approach to the level of knowledge required, which in turn depends on 
the category of liability being used. This will be returned to below, but first it is necessa 
to deal with some remaining knowledge issues. 
76 Above n 19,235. 
77 Cowan de Groot Properties Ltd v Eagle Trust pie [1992] 4 All ER 700, 761 . 1bis statement was cited 
with approval by Lord Nicholls in Royal Brunei Airlines above n 12, 74; and by Blanchard Jin Nimmo v 
Westpac Banking Corporation above n 19,228. 
78 See Sir Robin Cooke Equity in Commercial Relationships (New Zealand Law Society Conference, 
Wellington, 1993) 2. 
79 See Finn p 215. 
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B A Bank's Knowledge 
Since a bank is an artificial person, it is necessary to identify individuals whose knowledge 
can be attributed to it. Traditionally, the knowledge of the bank manager has been the 
knowledge of the bank. Accordingly, the bank manager's diary has been a fertile source 
of inculpatory evidence. However, with the advance of modem technology, and the 
sheer bulk of daily transactions, it is increasingly likely that the branch manager has no 
cogniz.ance of the facts giving rise to liability in any given situation. 
Thus, the knowledge of other staff becomes crucial to the interests of the bank. The issue 
is to identify which employees' knowledge can properly be attributed to the corporate 
structure as a whole. The position has been summarized by the Privy Council as 
follows:80 
[G]iven that [the substantive rule] was intended to apply to a company, how was it intended 
to apply? Whose act (or knowledge, or state of mind) was for this purpose intended to 
count as the act etc of the company? One finds the answer to this question by applying the 
usual canons of interpretation, taking into account the language of the rule (if it is a statute) 
and its content and policy. 
This represents a departure from the old "directing mind and will" rule, which by 
definition suggested only senior employees' knowledge would count as the knowledge of 
the compa.riy. 
The attribution of an employee' s knowledge to the company \.\ill depend upon the 
circumstances, with the crucial element being the nature of the functions performed by 
the employee. Whether or not an individual has authority to perform the particular 
transaction is a key factor. 81 IBtimately, if an employee has responsibility for the matter 
with which the particular rule is concerned, his or her knowledge should be attributed to 
the bank. 82 
80 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v New Zealand Securities Commission [ 1995) 3 WLR 
413,419. 
81 R v Rozeik (1996) BCLC 380. 
82 See R Grantham and B Robertson '"Corporate Knowledge - Two Views on Meridian" (1996) 2 
NZBLQ 63, 65. 
Hence, the rogue bank teller who violates the bank's internal instructions and facilitates 
fraud could have his or her knowledge attributed to the bank. 83 It will be incumbent on 
the bank to regulate the conduct of all its employees. 
A related issue is aggregating the knowledge of different staff members. 84 Due to the 
electronic sophistication and disjointed nature of bank transactions, a number of 
employees may participate in a single transaction, each holding a different piece of 
knowledge. Thus, the facts known to a single employee may not be enough to arouse 
suspicion, but an aggregation of the various pieces would. 85 
It would be unduly harsh to lay blame on a bank because of a failure to piece together th 
clues known by various staff members. One solution is to require a single employee to 
possess the requisite knowledge before it is attributed to the bank. 66 Alternatively, the 
knowledge of those working in a single department could be aggregated. Such 
approaches are supported by Blanchard J's comment in Westpac Banking Corporation, 
Nimmo: 87 
It is simply asking too much of a banker to expect it to monitor the numerous transactions 
of its many customers through its separate departments with the precision which would 
have been needed to pick up what was occurring at that time. 
C Knowledge of a Breach of Trust or Fiduciary Duty 
For equity to inteivene, the funds in question must be subject to a trust. Equity is 
concerned with protecting the beneficiary against the wrongdoing of his or her trustee, 
and those who deal with the trustee. In addition, the beneficiary under a fiduciary 
relationship has been assimilated with the trust beneficiary for the purposes of 
constructive trustee liability. 88 Indeed, in the commercial arena, the misconduct 
83 See Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete (1995) l AC 456, where the knowledge of an employee who 
acted against express instructions was attributed to the company. As previously discussed, where an 
employee fails to follow the bank's internal instructions, then this may be indicative of negligence. 
84 For an example outside the banking conte:\.i, see Equificorp Industries Group Ltd v Attorney General 
Unreported, 12 July 1996, High Court, Auckland Registry, CP 2455/89. There, the knowledge of Crown 
servants was aggregated to form the whole. 
85 See above n 7, § 324.4. 
86 See above n 7, § 324.5. 
87 Above n 19, 232. 
88 See Westpac Banking Corporation v Savin above n 20. There, the Court of Appeal was content to 
assume that the rules relating to strangers as constructive trustees were equally applicable to breaches of 
fiduciary duties. 
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underlying the cause of action is more likely to be a breach of fiduciary duty than breach 
of trust. 
The simplest example is where an agent misdirects the principal' s funds. 
89 Similarly, a 
partner may use partnership property for an improper purpose. 
90 However, perhaps the 
most important and far-reaching situation is where an employee misdirects company 
funds.91 
The Court of Appeal has exhibited a strong desire for the maintenance of general 
fiduciary relationship rules. In Westpac Banking Corporation v Savin, Richardson J 
reiterated that when property is entrusted to an agent, the beneficial ownership remains 
with the original owner. When the property is sold, the money received immediately 
becomes the property of the principal. However, this general rule can be varied by the 
terms of the agency. It must be determined from the agreement and dealings considered 
against the surrounding circumstances whether the parties intended to displace the general 
rule.92 Even if an implied agreement which allows the fiduciary to act outside the normal 
rules is found to exist, the fiduciary must still refrain from receiving benefit beyond 
normal professional fees.
93 Accordingly, although a fiduciary may be entitled to apply 
funds to an overdrawn account in the ordinary course of business, "it does not follow that 
the authorisation extends to situations where the [fiduciary] is in a precarious financial 
state and the payment is in partial discharge of his personal indebtedness to the bank. "
94 
In Westpac Banking Corporation v Ance/f5 the fiduciary relationship between a 
sharebroker and his clients was in issue. It was argued that the normal rules enunciated in 
Savin were displaced in the circumstances of the case. The bank argued that the 
sharebroker's business was carried out on a debtor/creditor basis with clients,
96 and he 
was therefore entitled to pay the funds into the overdrawn account. 
89 See Westpac Banking Corporation v Savin above .n 20, where the agent was a boat dealer selling on 
behalf of the principal. Westpac Banking Corporation v Ancell above n 23, where a sharebroker 
misdirected client funds. 
90 See Lankshear v ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd above n 28. 
91 SeeAgip (Africa) Ltdv Jackson above n 25. In Springfield Acres Ltd (in liq) v Abacus (Hong Kong) 
Ltd above n 43, it was the directors which breached fiduciary duties owed to the company. 
92 Above n 20, 49. 
93 Above n 20, 50; above n 23, 103,264. 
94 Above n 23, 103,264. 
95 Above n 23. 
96 There were three limbs to this argwnent. Firstly, the actual dealings between broker and client were 
argued to have taken place on a debtor/creditor basis. Secondly, there was an implied term in the 
contracts based on the general custom that sharebrokers operate on a debtor/creditor basis. Thirdly, there 
was implied authority from the customers to pay funds into the overdrawn account. 
The Court of Appeal held that the general rules remained intact, due mainly to the clients 
understanding that money received by the sharebroker was held in some form of trust fo1 
their benefit. They did not believe that they were mere W1Secured creditors, and could 
not be subject to industry custom if they were unaware of it. 
The decision represents a strong adherence to the maintenance of fiduciary rules. 97 They 
will not be set aside unless the bank can show the beneficiary fully understood that 
monies were not to be held in trust. In practice, this may mean express agreement is 
needed. 
Another feature of the Ancell decision is Richardson J"s comment that there was no 
authority to pay client funds into "the bank account which was overdrawn or could be 
overdrawn. "98 Read literally, this statement suggests a breach of fiduciary duty could 
occur even when funds are deposited into an account in credit. If the account later went 
into overdraft, and circumstances changed such that the money was not repaid to the 
beneficiaries, then the bank could face liability as an accessory. 
Liability as constructive trustee will only attach when the bank has the requisite 
knowledge of a breach of trust or fiduciary duty. The mere fact that the bank knows its 
customer habitually receives money on account of others is not enough. 99 The required 
knowledge may be relatively easy to establish when the plaintiff is a beneficiary under a 
'core' fiduciary relationship. However, knowledge of a breach "is not so easy to establisl 
in cases arising from the increasingly unclear edges of the expanding law of 
fiduciaries." 100 If the "crucial question ... is whether at the material time the person sough 
to be made accountable knew of the material facts giving rise to the subsistence of the 
fiduciary duty and its breach", 101 and dishonesty is not required to fix liability, a bank ma) 
find itself liable even where it reasonably believed no trust existed. 
However, a defendant should have knowledge of something more than a "doubtful 
equity". If the existence of a trust or fiduciary duty involves difficult questions of fact 
and law, then it is difficult to ex post facto impute notice of the trust to the bank.102 
97 Professor Rickett questions whether it was indeed correct to find a breach of fiduciary duty in this case 
See above n 30,371. 
98 Above n 23, 103,270. 
99 Above n 40. 
100 Above n 30, 371. 
101 Per Cooke P (as he was then) in Gathergood v Blundell & Brown Ltd [ 1992) 3 NZLR 643, 646. 
102 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Herbert Smith & Co (No 2) [1969) 2 Ch 276,293 per Danckwerts LJ. 
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D Accessory Liability 
1 The dishonesty requirement 
In Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhdv Tan, 1ro the Privy Council injected long overdue 
certainty into the principles of 'accessory liability' (the term used by their Lordships). 
Lord Nicholls explained the rationale for imposing liability in accessory situations:
104 
The rationale is not far to seek. Beneficiaries are entitled to expect that those who become 
trustees will fulfil their obligations. They are entitled to expect, and this is only a short step 
further, that those who become trustees will be permitted to fulfil their obligations without 
deliberate irltervention from third parties. They are entitled to expect that third parties will 
refrairl from irltentionally irltruding irl the trustee-beneficiary relationship and thereby 
hirldering a beneficiary from receiving his entitlement irl accordance with the tenns of the 
trust instrument. 
24 
It follows from this rationale that strict liability is not appropriate for accessory liability. 
Fault is required as the defendant's "only sin is that he interfered with the due 
performance by the trustee of the :fiduciary obligations undertaken by the trustee."
105 
Accordingly, the focus is purely on the behaviour of the assistor. 
106 Questions of priority 
in property are irrelevant, as the "accessory is a person who either never received the 
property at all, or who received it irt circumstances where his receipt was irrelevant. "
107 
Liability cannot be stti.ct, as beneficia1i.es "could not reasonably expect that third parties 
should deal with trustees at their peril." 
108 
Next, the degree of 'fault' required to fix liability was discussed. After considering the 
authorities and academic commentaries, Lord Nicholls stated that dishonesty is a 
necessary requirement for liability. 109 There is nothing new in this approach. The 
majority of New Zealand cases stipulate that dishonesty is the threshold for accessory 
103 Above n 12. 
104 Above n 12, 71. 
105 Above n 12, 71. 
106 Above n 24, 78. 
107 Above n 2, 83. 
108 Above n 12, 71 . 
109 Above n 12, 76. 
liability. 110 Although English authority initially allowed negligence to fix liability, 111 
modern authority is clear in its demand for dishonesty.
112 
The novelty in their Lordships' 
approach was the abandonment of knowledge as an indicator of dishonesty. The New 
Zealand decisions have tended to equate dishonesty with the first three Baden categories. 
Their Lordships suggested the Baden scale of knowledge should be forgotten. 113 
Despite this, it would appear the Baden scale is not yet extinct. Indeed, Lord Nicholls 
confessed that actual knowledge, wilful blindness114 and reckless disregard of other 
peoples' possible rights115 all point to dishonesty. Dishonesty will always be measured by 
what the defendant actually knew, which provides an irresistible temptation for the 
retention of some type of knowledge scale. 
Accordingly, it may be questioned whether the Privy Council has provided a new way 
forward, or whether courts will ultimately rely on the old principles of knowledge 
established in previous case law. 
Greig J's decision in Cigna Life Insurance New Zealand Ltdv Westpac Securities Ltc/ 16 
highlights the difficulties which now face New Zealand judges. His Honour fully 
accepted that following Royal Brunei, the relevant test was one of dishonesty. He frarne1 
his decision on this aspect in the following way:117 
In this case, as I have noted, the plaintiff grounds the claim upon the last three of the Baden 
categories ofknowledge.118 There is no suggestion and no scintilla of evidence of any 
iinpropriety or lack of probity or dishonesty whatsoever on the pai--t of the defendant or any 
of its servants or agents. It is quite plain that none of them knew or wilfully shut their eyes 
to any circumstance which might have made obvious the fraud which the thief was 
perpetrating. 
110 See above n 43, 728; above n 19,228. Compare with the approach in Powe/Iv Thompson [1991] l 
NZLR 597, where a much more flexible test was allowed. 
111 Selangor United Rubber Estatesv Craddock (No.3) [1968] 2 All ER 1073; KarakRubber CoLtdv 
Burden [ 1972] 1 All ER 121 O; Baden above n 37. 
112 In Re Montagu 's Settlement Trusts [1987] Ch 264, 285;Agip {Africa) Ltd v Jackson above n 25, 293, 
Eagle Trust Pie v SBC Securities Ltd above n 48, 495; Polly Peck International Pie v Nadir (No 2) [ 1992 
4 All ER 769, 777 (CA). 
113 Above n 12, 76. 
114 Above n 12, 73. 
115 Above n 12, 74. 
116 Aboven 14. 
117 Above n 14, 88. 
118 The plaintiff was also claiming in 'knowing receipt', which perhaps explains the reference to the 
Baden categories, despite the Privy Council's assertion that Baden should be forgotten in the accessory 
liability cases. As will be discussed below, Baden still has a part to play in New Zealand cases dealing 
with knowing receipt. 
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Hence the Baden scale remained relevant to the determination of dishonesty. This was a 
clear-cut case, as there was nothing to raise suspicion in the mind of the reasonable 
person in the defendant's position. Accordingly, Greig J was not required to analyse the 
intricacies of the Royal Brunei test for dishonesty. 
Similarly, in Equiticorp Industries Group Ltd v Attorney General, 119 Smellie J found that 
the Crown wilfully shut its eyes to the obvious, or at least wilfully and recklessly failed to 
inquire. In deference to Royal Brunei, it was suggested that when viewed objectively, this 
amounted to dishonesty. 
2 The conduct of the trustee 
Prior to Royal Brunei, a literal reading of Lord Selborne's statement required the stranger 
to assist in a dishonest or fraudulent design. 120 It is not clear why it has been thought 
necessaiy to give "almost biblical reverence" 121 to this requirernent. 122
 The conduct of the 
accessory is all important. If he or she is dishonest, it should be irrelevant whether or not 
the principal was unscrupulous also. Furthermore, the trustee's liability is strict, so any 
secondary liability should not be premised on the state of mind of the principal. 123 
As Mr Harpum points out, 124 the authorities had created a separate category of 
'inconsistent dealing': An 'inconsistent dealer' is someone who receives the property in a 
ministerial capacity, while a 'knowing assistor' never possesses the property. In the 
'inconsistent dealing' cases, it is irrelevant whether the trustee acted fraudulently or not. 125 
119 Above n 84. 
120 New Zealand cases have been inconsistent in dealing with this aspect. In Equiticorp Industries 
Group Ltd v Hawkins above n 43, a dishonest trustee was required. In Gathergood v Blundell & Brown 
Ltd above n 101, Cooke P did not require proof of dishonesty from the trustee. In Springfield Acres 
above n 43, the inconsistency did not need to be dealt with, as the trustee acted fraudulently. 
121 Above n I, 205. 
122 As C Harpum points out in above n 13, 11-12: the cases prior to Barnes v Addy did not insist on the 
dishonest and fraudulent design requirement - see for example Fyler v Fyler ( 1841) 3 Beav 550. 
Furthermore, Barnes v Addy was an unreserved judgement given without discussion of the earlier 
authorities. It was not until Belmont Finance Corporation Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd [ 1979] Ch 250 
that the 'dishonest and fraudulent design' requirement was established post Barnes v Addy. 
123 Above n 13, 10. As Professor Finn points out in above n l , 206: the more stringent the knowledge 
requirement of the third party, the less obvious the reason for differentiating between types of conduct of 
the primary wrongdoer. 
124 See above n 13, 16. Mr Harpum suggests the relevant authorities are Lee v Sankey (1873) LR 15 Eq 
204 and Soar v Ashwell [1893] 2 Ch 390. 
125 See above n 25, 292. 
However, the knowledge required by the defendant was equivalent to the 'knowing 
assistance' category. 126 
Following Royal Brunei, both categories can be grouped under a generic accessory 
liability principle, due to the Privy Council's advice that to impose liability as an 
accessory, "[i]t is not necessary that, in addition, the trustee or fiduciary was acting 
dishonestly" .127 
3 The appropriateness of dishonesty 
Even though the requirement for dishonesty in accesso1y liability is now settled, it is 
worthwhile examining the arguments which suggest the dishonesty standard is too lenient. 
Banks present themselves as efficiently managed, prudent institutions. They must be, to 
maintain customer confidence. Arguably, upon failure to meet the advertised standards, 
banks should be prepared to suffer the consequences. Indeed, it could be viewed as 
wholly appropriate to impose a high standard on banks, and hence cast them into a 
policing role, as they are in a unique position to prevent fraudulent conduct. 128 
A standard lower than dishonesty would not be over burdensome for banks, as the "law 
here is genuinely sensitive to the usual colllSe of honest bm;iness in any context in 
question, and genuinely postulates context-sensitive fault." 129 Fears of uncertainty in the 
application of the law are unfounded, as the criteria are sufficiently clear to negate the 
influence of individual variances in the judiciary. 13° Furthermore, bank procedures are 
not set in stone, and constantly change to reflect and accommodate the various demands 
placed upon them. 131 
The concerns expressed are legitimate. Fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty is becoming 
more commonplace. The natural tendency is to place greater responsibility on those who 
are in the best positions to protect innocent victims. 
126 Above n 13, 17. 
127 Above n 12, 76. Hence, any argument as to whether the bank is properly thought of as a 'knowing 
assistor' or ' inconsistent dealer' becomes redundant. 
128 See above n 50, 80 for a more detailed discussion. 
129 G Elias Explaining Constructive Trusts (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990) 81 . Elias further 
suggests that in cases where banks have been found liable due to carelessness, fault was genuinely 
present. 
130 P Loughlan "Liability for Assistance in a Breach of Fiduciary Duty" (1989) 9 OJLS 260, 269. 
131 Above n 50, 80. 
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Consider again the facts of Nimmo v Westpac Banking Corporation.
132 There, the loss 
caused by the bank following its customer' instructions would have been prevented if the 
appropriate inquiry was made. However, such inquiry was not required by the bank's 
internal instructions. According to expert evidence, these instructions did not measure up 
to an acceptable banking standard. Blanchard J found the bank negligent, but there was 
no suggestion of dishonesty. 
The case illustrates the concerns of the arguments against dishonesty. If the fraudulent 
customer had tried his scheme at another bank, he would probably have been caught. 
Why should the defendant bank escape liability when it has failed to attain an acceptable 
banking standard, and was indeed negligent in this respect? 
This is not an easy question to answer. In defence of the bank, it is easy to be wise in 
hindsight. It is easy to analyse the facts in court, and point out where a reasonable banker 
might have done things differently. However, as highlighted previously, a bank faces 
daunting commercial pressure. It should be assumed that a bank is loathe to assist in 
fraud. The bank can best determine whether the risk of fraud is sufficient to warrant 
disruption to the normal efficient flow of banking business. A requirement of dishonesty 
allows banks to formulate their own practice to deal with fraud. They are in the best 
position to weigh the competing interests, and develop procedures to reflect this. With 
the expanding role of electronic payment systems, banks are particularly careful in 
developing systems which reduce the possibilities of fraud. It is fair to assume that banks 
are fully aware of their responsibilities in reducing fraud, without the necessity of 
imposing a duty of care to reinforce the point. 
There are further arguments in principle against allowing negligence or notice to fix 
liability for accessory liability. In Royal Brunei, Lord Nicholls suggested that a bank 
already owes a duty of care to the trustee. The beneficiaries can enforce this duty if the 
trustee is unwilling to do so. Therefore, "it is difficult to identify a compelling reason 
why, in addition ... third parties should also owe a duty of care directly to the 
beneficiaries. "133 Furthermore, "beneficiaries cannot reasonably expect that all the world 
dealing with their trustees should owe them a duty of care lest the trustee are behaving 
dishonestly. "134 Whatever one may choose to make of such an attitude, 
135 it captures the 
132 Above n 19. 
133 Above n 12, 75. 
134 Above n 12, 76. 
135 For a critique, see above n 50, 73-76. 
essential flavour of the matter. If a bank is to be held liable due to its carelessness, it is 
more appropriate to apply the comprehensive principles of the tort of negligence. In 
some circumstances, there may also be a contractual duty of care.136 
If found liable, the bank will be exposed to the same range of remedies as are available 
against the primary wrongdoer. Why should a bank be asked to bear the risk of a 
fiduciary's disloyalty instead of the beneficiary?137 Where a bank has retained no benefit 
from the transaction, it would seem unduly onerous to impose liability in the absence of 
dishonesty. 
E Liability for Knmving Receipt 
1 The 'mixed' account and constructive notice 
Special considerations apply when the bank has received property. Equity has 
traditionally imposed more rigorous standards on those who retain the benefits of 
unconscionable conduct. This is illustrated by the cases where a bank has express 
knowledge that an account is fixed with a trust. If the bank receives funds into the 
customer's personal overdrawn account in breach of that trust, it cannot avoid liability b) 
pleading ignorance of the trust's exact terms. The mere presence of the trust account 
puts the bank on inquiry:138 
It is said that they did not know what the trust was at the time. Th.at appears to me, I 
confess, to be immaterial, because those who know that a fund is a trust fund carmot take 
possession of that fund for their own benefit, except at the risk of being liable to refund it in 
the event of the trust being broken by the payment of the money. 
Difficulties arise when the bank's customer is a fiduciary in the practice of applying both 
trust moneys and personal funds to a single account. In the absence of inquiry, a bank 
can never be sure which funds are subject to ttusts, and which are not. The simple 
solution is to request the customer to pay trust funds into a separate trust account. 
136 See Lipkin Gonnan v Karpnale [1989] 1 WLR 1340, where the English Court of Appeal expressed a 
desire that contractual duties be used to resolve issues, with equitable rules providing a last resort. 
137 Above n 1, 210. 
138 Foxton v Manchester and Liverpool District Banking Co (1881) 44 LT 406, 408. Compare with 
Coleman v Bucks and Oxon Union Bank [ 1897] 2 Ch 243: where it was thought that the bankers must 
have "the slightest knowledge or reasonable suspicion" of a breach of trust. The authors of Paget 's LaYt 
of Banking note that Foxton is probably the correct approach: above n 6, 91 . 
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Accordingly, if trust funds were subsequently paid into a customer's overdrawn personal 
account, the bank would be entitled to assert a lack of notice if a trust was breached. 
139 
However, practice is rarely so straightforward, and a collection of cases have dealt with 
the situation where the bank's customer operates a 'mixed' account. 
For example, in Thomson v Clydesdale Bank Ltd, 
140 the bank's customer was a 
sharebroker who applied both personal and trust funds to his overdrawn account. 
Similarly, in Stephens Travel Service v Qantas, 
141 it was a travel agent's overdrawn 
account which caused difficulties for the bank. In New Zealand, boat dealers have also 
created problems. 142 
As stated earlier, a consequence of Foley v Hill is that collecting bankers are generally not 
concerned with the source or nature of customer funds. Lord Herschell LC in Thomson 
v Clydesdale Bank Ltd took this proposal even fu11her: 143 
My Lords, I carmot assent to the proposition that even if a person receiving money knows 
that such money has been received by the person paying it to him on account of other 
persons, that of itself is sufficient to prevent the payment being a good payment and 
properly discharging the debt due to the person who receives the money. 
Hence, a bank is not required to make inquiries simply because of a likelihood that a 
customer holds money for others. The bank is entitled to treat those funds as the absolute 
property of the customer. 
Lord Herschell LC later said that it must be shown the recipient had "reason to believe" a 
breach of trust was being committed before inquiry was needed. However, Lord Watson 
used stronger language, and suggested a banker would not be liable unless the claimant 
"can shew that the recipient of the money did not transact in good faith with his 
agent."144 Furthermore, "the onus of proving [the bank] acted in mala tides rests with the 
[claimants]. "
145 
In Westpac Banking Corporation v Savin, Sir Clifford Richmond diffused this dishonesty 
requirement by suggesting it was inconsistent with the later House of Lords decision in 
139 See above n 64, 360. 
140 Above n 40. 
141 Above n 64. 
142 Above n 20;Anderson v Chilton (1993) 4 NZBLC 103,375. 
143 Above n 40, 288. 
144 Above n 40,289 (emphasis added). 
145 Above n 40, 290. 
Reckittv Barnett, Pembroke and Slater Ltd, 146 where a car dealer was held liable for 
receipt despite an absence of dishonesty. In accordance with Richardson and McMullin 
JJ, he endorsed the application of an objective standard of knowledge when the bank 
receives funds into an overdrawn account. Therefore, the apparent position in New 
Zealand is that constructive notice is enough to fix liability for knowing receipt. This vie 
has not been challenged in the subsequent cases. 147 
Although constructive notice probably provides the threshold for liability, the judiciary 
has only dealt with banks which have acted dishonestly. The bounds of constructive 
notice have never been judicially tested. 148 In light of the potential implications for 
banking practice, this is a source of concern. Certainty as to the limits of constructive 
notice would greatly assist banks, as the rules presently suffer ambiguity. The burden fo 
banks is to identify when an inquiry into a proposed transaction is necessary. 
2 A benefit designed or stipulated for 
As the New Zealand cases illustrate, when a bank designs or stipulates for a reduction ill 
an overdraft, it will inevitably possess knowledge which renders the subsequent receipt o 
funds dishonest. 
The leading case is Westpac Banking Corporation v Savin. 149 The facts provide a stark 
example of bank misconduct. The bank knew that its customer was a dealer in boats, ar 
that three out of four sales were 'on behalf of' transactions. It knew the customer treate 
'on behalf of' funds as separate from ordinary trade funds, and was not entitled to pay 
them into the overdrawn account. Furthermore, the bank was constantly supervising tht 
overdrawn account, and pressuring its customer to delay payments to prevent the 
overdraft from being increased further. Indeed:150 
146 [1929] AC 176. 
147 See above n 14, 88 for the most recent pronouncement against dishonesty. However, the correctne~ 
of constructive notice as the applicable standard is not established beyond doubt: above n 84. The law i 
' knowing receipt' has produced some remarkably divergent judgements in the English case law. There 
remain differences as to whether dishonesty is required (Re Montagz1 's Settlement Tmsts [1987] 2 WLf 
1192; above n 71; above n 72),or whether cons1ructive notice of the breach of trust is enough to fix 
liability (above n 25; above n 48; above n 77; above n 65). The more recent authority tends towards 
constructive notice as the applicable standard, but see above n 50, 60-64 for a discussion on the variance 
in the definitions ofnotice. 
148 See above n 30, 367: "other fact situations in the future may not be so kind to the judges, and some 
clearer distinctions need to be drawn." 
149 Above n 20. 
150 Above n 20, 54. 
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111at actual knowledge of the bank was such that in receiving those cheques and applying 
them in reduction of the overdraft it must be concluded that it wilfully shut its eyes to the 
obvious ... or, at least, that it wilfully and recklessly failed to ascertain and satisfy itself that 
the receipts were not in respect of' on behalf sales. 
This was clearly a case where the imposition of constructive trnsteeship upon the bank 
was warranted. 
32 
The next case in which the Cow1 of Appeal assessed the position of a bank was Westpac 
Banking Corporation v Ancell.151
 The facts followed a similar pattern to Westpac 
Banking Corporation v Savin. This time the bank's customer was a sharebroker, whose 
overdraft facility was being closely monitored due to its perilous state. Throughout the 
supervision period, the bank knew that the sharebroker was continuing to cany out 
business on behalf of his clients, and that proceeds from share sales were received into 
the account. The bank encouraged the postponement of payments to clients so that the 
account could be maintained. 
The finding of knowledge was inevitable. As Richardo;on J suggesle<l, the "inference that 
the bank was consciously benefiting from the resulting use of the funds of the broker's 
clients is inescapable. "152 
So in these two cases, the facts highlighted the presence of dishonesty. In Westpac 
Banking Corporation v Savin, it was because the bank knew that "it was unthinkable that 
the boat owners would have agreed to what was going on if they had been made aware of 
the real position. "
153 In Westpac Banking Corporation v A ncell, it was because "the bank 
must have known that it was unthinkable that the sharebroker 's clients ... would have 
agreed to what was going on if they had been made aware of the real posilion.''
154 There 
was no need to consider the limits of a bank's duty to inquire into the source of funds 
when recei\.-ing them into an overdrawn account. 
The same can be said of the relevant High Cqurt decisions, where dishonesty has 
invariably fixed liability. In Anderson v Chilton,
155 the facts were almost identical to 
Savin, and the bank had closely monitored the boat dealer customer's overdrawn account. 
151 Above n 23. 
152 Above n 23, 103,272. 
153 Above n 20, 71 per Sir Clifford Richmond. 
i:.;.i Above n 23,103,272. 
155 Above n 142. 
Again, in lankshear v ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd, 156 the bank stipulated fo 
a reduction in the overdrawn account. Furthermore, it was aware of the source of the 
funds, and the purpose for which its customer held them. 
Even if dishonesty is not shown on the facts, it seems likely a cou11 will impose liability if 
reasonable inquiries are not made. It is this type of situation which Richardson J had 
specifically in mind when expressing the opinion that constructive notice could suffice fo: 
knowing receipt:157 
Clearly Courts would not readiiy import a duty to inquire in the case of commercial 
transactions where they nmst be conscious of the seriously inhibiting effects ofa wide 
application of the doctrine. Nevertheless there must be cases where there is no justification 
on the known facts for allowing a commercial man who has received funds paid to him in 
breach of trust to plead the shelter of the exigencies of commercial life... Where the 
creditor is pressing for payment and designs and stipulates for that benefit, it will be less 
easy for the creditor to contend that the regular pressures of commercial life must be taken 
to have ruled out any need for inquiry. 
This is consistent with the notion that commercial entities who act in good faith should 
not be troubled with facts which are not obvious or easy to uncover. 158 However, if the 
bank i~ prepared to spend time closely monitoring the operation of an account, and make 
detailed inquiries into the state of its customer's affairs, then it is harder to argue against 
the imposition of a duty to in.quite into the source of flifids received. Furthemwfe, 
supervision occurs when the account is in a perilous state. Hence, if the bank knows the 
customer receives funds in a fiduciary capacity, it should appreciate that the risk of 
misappropriation is at its highest, and that an inquiry into the source of funds is desirable 
3 Funds received in the ordinary cO:Arse of business 
It has been argued, that following the Court of Appeal's decision in Westpac Banking 
Corporation v Ancell, a bank is put on notice of possible impropriety by its customer 
whenever it receives money into an overdrawn account. 159 This is supported by 
156 Above n 28. 
157 Above n 20, 53 (emphasis added). 
158 Above n 50, 91. 
159 P De Silva "Overdrawn Accounts: Bank's Liability" [1994] NZLJ 275, 276. 
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Richardson J's comment that in "accepting a cheque or other payment and crediting it 
against the customer's private overdraft the bank is advancing its personal interest."
160 
This statement could indicate that whenever a bank receives money into an overdrawn 
account, liability for kno\ving receipt can arise upon a failure to make appropriate 
inquiries. 
However, it is suggested that one must be more careful when drawing general conclusions 
from constructive trust cases, as so much turns on the particular facts. Even though it has 
been general in its comments, the Court of Appeal has only dealt with banks which have 
designed for a benefit and retained it, making it difficult to say with certainty what the 
appropriate rules are beyond such a situation. Indeed, in Westpac Banking Corporation 
v Ancell, Richardson J expressly noted that the Court of Appeal was not required to 
undertake a review of the authorities, since dishonesty was supported by the facts. 
161 
When the appropriate case arises, the judiciary will be asked to consider whether funds 
received into an overdrawn account in the ordinary course of business can establish the 
bank as beneficial recipient. The answer is not clear. 
Technically, a bank asserts a title of its own to funds paid into an overdrawn account, and 
therefore receives them. However, :funds received in the usual course of business can be 
quickly offset by further drawings by the customer. This is commonplace in the 
operation of trading accounts. The bank merely acts as a channel for the allocation of 
funds, and does not seek to reduce its debt. Any real benefit to the bank is through the 
interest it charges on its loan. In short, it is arguable that the hank is not a beneficial 
recipient in such a case. 
This issue was addressed in Stephens Travel Service v Qanta<;.
162 The defendant bank's 
customer sold tickets as agent for Qantas. The moneys received from sales were regularly 
paid into the customer's overdrawn account. Usually, the trust obligation to account to 
Qantas was satisfied when the bank honoured a cheque dra\\'TI every two weeks. Hence, 
when a cheque made out to Qantas was subsequently dishonoured, it claimed against the 
bank for knowing receipt. 
160 Above n 23, 103,270. Almost exactly the same words were used by him in above n 20, 52 . See also 
Sir Clifford Richmond in above n 20, 69: where it is suggested that a bank receiving funds into an 
overdrawn account is in the same position as any other creditor. 
161 Above n 23, 103,270. 
162 Above n 64. 
Hope JA reviewed the authorities, and decided that the bank could only be a beneficial 
recipient if it had designed and stipulated for a reduction in the overdraft. If the accoun 
had continued to be run in the ordinary way, the bank would not have been a beneficial 
recipient of the funru. paid into the overdrawn account. 16J In the case before him, the 
bank had required a reduction in the overdraft prior to dishonouring the cheque, hence 
notice was enough to fix. liability for knowing receipt. 
In making his decision, Hope JA relied on the authority of Gray v Johnston. In that cas 
the House of Lords indicated that a benefit must be gained by the bank to attract liabili~ 
as a constructive trnstee. In the ,vords of Lord Westbury: 164 
The question, therefore, resolves itself into one of fact. Can the payment oftltat money to 
the credit of the account of the new firm be properly tTeated as a payment for the benefit of 
the bankers, designed and intended to be the means of payment to the bankers of the debt 
that might be due to them on the new accounr7 
His Lordship decided that no such benefit was obtained by the bank, as the account 
continued to be a current account run in the ordinary way, and then continued:165 
If it had been so accomplished; if a balance had been immediately struck, and the sum of 
money so paid had been appropriated at once to the payment of the balance due on that 
account to the bankers ... then we should want no more to compel restitution from the 
bankers, and the case would fall within the ambit of well-settled and firmly-fixed authorities. 
Hence, there is a good argument that funds paid into an overdraw11 account in the 
ordinary course of business do not make the bank a beneficial recipient. However, the 
problems with this analysis should not be ignored. 
Firstly, such a conclusion runs against the general tenor of the New Zealand cases dealin 
with banks a~ recipients.166 Secondly, the context of the Gray v Johnston decision is 
important. A benefit designed or stipulated for was merely a circumstance which knde, 
to prove ''privity" with the breach oftrust. 167 In the words of Lord Cairns:t68 
163 Above n 64, 365-366. 
164 Above n 70, 15. 
165 Above n 70, 16. 
166 See text at above n 160. 
167 See above n 111, 1101. See also Richardson Jin above n 23, 103,271: "ltis one but not the only 
means of establishing priv:ity." 
168 Above n 70, 11. 
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[I]fit be shewn that any personal benefit to the banker U1cm:,dve:, 1:, de:,igned or stipuh1ted 
for, that circumstance, above all oti1ers, will most readily establish the fact that the banke1s 
are in privity with the breach of trust which is about to be committed. 
36 
On the other hand, if money was applied lo lhe overdrawn account as a matter of 
ordinary business routine, "it appears to me wholly impossible to imagine that the bankers 
can have been influenced, in any degree, in their conduct by the indirect and incidental 
benefit which they thus derived. "169 
This observation is even more pertinent to the modem context. where account balances 
change drastically depending on the daily fluctuations common to a dealer's business. An 
account could just as easily be in credit rather than debit. It is difficult to imagine a bank 
being influenced in its decision to execute a transaction simply hecause the payment is to 
an overdrawn account run in the ordinary way. 
However, when a bank consciously strives to advance its own interests, it can be more 
readily assumed that the bank's conduct will be influenced by the reward it stands to 
receive. Therefore, as a matter of equitable p1inciple, a more onerous duty of inquiry is 
justified to protect innocent third party beneficiaries from the influence which a bank 
exerts over trustees and fiduciaries. 
However, these arguments assume that the conduct of the recipient is directly in issue. 
As will soon be illustrated, modem opinion employs a broader approach to knowing 
receipt, and emphasizes property protection as the basis for liability. Accordingly, 
constructive notice could be enough to fix liability for funds received in the course of 
normal business routine, notwithstanding that such receipt was irrelevant to the bank's 
decision to execute its customer's instructions. 
It therefore remains unsafe, to say the least, for a bank to assume that it is immune from 
knowing receipt liability and the accompanying spectre of constructive notice, merely 
because an overdrawn account is run in the ordinary course of business. Banks are well 
advised to take special care to ensure that money received truly belongs to the customer, 
especially when those customers are operating mixed accounts in overdraft.
170 
Before these difficulties can be resolved, and the detailed rules clarified, the rationale for 
receipt based liability will need to be clearly articulated by the judiciary. The alternatives 
will now be looked at. 
169 Above n 70, 13. 
170 Above n 30, 366. 
VI THE FUTURE OF RECEIPT BASED CLAIMS 
A The Rationale For Liability 
The judiciary has refrained from presenting a comprehensive analysis of the rationale fo 
receipt based liability.171 In Lank.shear v ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd, the 
following was said about knowing receipt:172 
[I]t can be viewed simply as a claim for a personal remedy against the defendant for 
misapplying what it knew to be trust or partnership funds for its own benefit. Alternatively, 
it is possible to emphasize the concept of unjust eruiclunent as the unifying and essential 
basis for the imposition of a constructive trust in cases of knowing receipt. 
There is no doubt that knowing receipt is a personal claim for value received. Its succes 
does not depend on whether the recipient still has the property in his or her hands. 
However, as the above comment illustrates, there is debate as to whether 
unconscionability or unjust enrichment provides the basis for liability. 
1 Unconscionability 
The clearest articulation of the unconscionability approach is Sir Robert Megarry VC's 
decision in Re Montagu 's Settlement Trust<J. 17j It was stressed that the equitable doctrin 
of tracing and the rules relating to the imposition of a constructive trust must be kept 
distinct. The property concepts of tracing are concerned with whether a recipient takes 
free of an existing equity, while the personal liability of knowing receipt is concerned wl 
imposing the obligations of trusteeship. Essentially, "there is more to being a trnstee tlu 
merely taking prope11y subject to an equity. "174 
Consequently, notice is not the appropriate criterion for a personal liability:175 
171 One notable exception is Powell v Thompson [ 199 1] l NZLR 597. This case is discussed further 
below. See also the detailed discussion in above n 10. 
172 Above n 28, 496. 
173 Above n 147. 
174 Above n 147, 1205. See also the comments of Scott LJ in Polly Peck Intemationa/ v Nadir (No 2) 
(1992] 4 All ER 769, 776: "Equitable tracing leads to a claim of a propriety character. A fund is identifie 
that, in equity, is regarded as a fund belonging to the claimant. The constructive trust claim ... is not a 
claim to any fund in specie. It is a claim to monetary compensation." 
175 Above n 147, 1204 (emphasis added). 
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It seems to me that one must be very careful about applying to constructive trusts either the 
accepted concepts of notice or any analogy to them. In detem1ining whether a constructive 
trust has been created, the fundamental question is whether the conscience of the recipient 
is bound in such a way as to justify equity in imposing a trust on him. 
When deciding whether the conscience of the recipient is bound to a degree which 
justifies liability, Sir Robert Megany VC thought knowledge (or dishonesty) should be 
the determinant, not notice.176 
The unconscionability approach also finds support in Consul Development Pty Ltd v 
DPC Estates Pty Ltd, where Stephen J thought it important that the rules did not 
"disregard equity's concern for the state of conscience of the defendant. "
177 
38 
However, it is not immediately clear why unconscionability must be equated with 
dishonesty in the knowing receipt cases. Depending on the situation, wrongful conduct 
could be equated with carelessness. Hence, those who oppose Sir Robert Megany's view 
emphasize the benefit gained by the defendant upon the receipt of the plaintiffs property. 
Mr Harpum suggests that "it is necessarily unconscionable for a person to receive for his 
own benefit somebody else's property in circumstances in which he ought to have 
realised that it was transferred to him in breach of trust."
178 
Further considerations were articulated in Equiticorp Finance Ltdv Bank of New 
Zealand, where it was suggested that by following Sir Robert Megany VC's approach, 
"the answer in each case depends upon the facts and impression they make on the 
decision maker."179 The aim should be to share risks equitably, while providing adequate 
stimulus to commercial morality. Accordingly, dishonesty need not always be required, 
"especially where [obtuseness] is rewarded with the receipt of funds the subject of the 
breach. "180 
The common theme of these arguments is that a person who receives property for his or 
her own benefit in circumstances in which he or she ought to have realised that it was 
transferred in breach of trust, should not be allowed to retain it. Thus the nature of the 
benefit is crucial. As indicated previously, it is contentious whether benefits received by 
176 Above n 147, 1211. 
171 Above n 45, 412. Hence the imposition of a duty to inquire was viewed unfavourably. 
178 Above n 13, 19. 
179 (1993) 32 NSWLR 50, 104 per Kirby P. 
180 Aboven 179,105. 
the bank in the ordinary course of business should be a petvasi:ve consideration.181 The 
concepts of notice should be used against those who advance their own interests, not 
those whose primary responsibility is to advance the interests of others. It is unreasonah 
for beneficiaries to expect banks to owe them a duty of care when dealing with their 
fiduciaries or trustees, unless the bank has actively pursued its own benefit to the 
detriment of the beneficiaries. 
2 Unjust enrichment 
The unconscionability approach to knowing receipt assumes the wrongful conduct of tht 
recipient is in issue. Restitutionists Mgue that this is fundamentally mistaken. They cl.air 
that a recipient's liability is not wrong based at all, but is predicated upon the receipt of 
property subject to a trust. Liability stems from the defendant taking property that 
belongs to another as his or her own. Hence, liability is imposed to restore the plaintitr1 
wealth, and is therefore not concerned with compensating for loss or damage. 182 
This restitutionary approach to knowing receipt is accumulating growing academic 
support, 183 and would now seem to be correct in law, following Lord Nicholl's commenl 
that "[r]ecipient liability is restitution based; accessory liability is not."184 However, the 
vagueness of this statement provides little guidance as to how an equitable restitutionary 
liability should operate in practice. There is no shortage of opinion from academic 
circles, where unjust enrichment is advanced as the guiding concept. 185 
An unjust enrichment analysis was used by Thomas J in Powell v Thompson, where it 
was claimed that "the underlying basis of the defendant's liability is the unjust enrichmer 
of the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff. "186 The essence of the claim is that the 
defendant has gained an advantage, and retention of that benefit is regarded as 
unconscionable. Accordingly:187 
181 See text at above n 169. 
182 Above n 84. 
183 See for example above n 13; above n 50; and most notably in New Zealand, Professor Rickett above 
24. See however Finn above n 1 for a strong argument in favour of wrongdoing as the basis for liability. 
184 Above n 12, 70. 1his approach was adopted by Smellie Jin above n 84. 
185 The watershed article is P Birks "Misdirected Funds: Restitution from the Recipient" [ 1989] LMCLQ 
296. 
186 Above n 171, 607. Rickett laments that the analysis undertaken by Thomas J "appears sadly to have 
been overlooked in most of the more recent airings that the subject has had in the Courts": above n 24, ' 
187 Above n 171, 608. 
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In deciding whether or not the defendant's enrichment is unjust, a Court of Equity will then 
have regard to all the circwnstances relating to the transfer of the trust property. Its 
determination will depend not just on the defendant's knowledge, but on all the 
circwnstances including, no doubt, factors relating to the deprivations suffered by the 
innocent plaintiff. 
Hence, the 'unjustness' of the enrichment is determined by reference to the 
circumstances as a whole. It is inappropriate to focus solely on the conduct of the 
defendant. The issue is whether the conscience of the court has been offended - not 
whether the defendant has acted unconscionably. 
40 
Therefore, depending on the circumstances, the knowledge required to fr~ liability could 
be very low. The idea "is to invoke a flexible yardstick"
188 to decide liability. An 
immediate concern is whether any sympathy is given co a bank due to its commercial 
obligations. It would seem that Thomas J is firmly against this notion. He stated that 
differing standards between commerce and ordinary citizens are undesirable, ''nor should 
the threshold of equity's tolerance be raised to meet some perceived commercial need."
189 
On the whole, Thomas J' s analysis does not indicate to banks the standard of conduct 
they are required to meet to avoid liability. Indeed, it would be contrary to Thomas J's 
overall scheme to lay down solid guidelines which would guarantee immunity. 
Powell v Thompson also raises conceptual issues about the legal nature of unjust 
enrichment The predominant view is that unjust erui.chment is merely a concept which 
explains existing legal rules, and is not a cause of action in itself:
190 
Accordingly, it is not legitimate to determine whether an enrichment is unjust by reference 
to some subjective evaluation of what is fair or unconscionable. Instead recovery depends 
upon the existence ofa qualifying or vitiating factor such as mistake, duress or illegality. 
188 Above n 171,614. 
189 Aboven 171,614. 
190 David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353, 379. See also 
above n 84. Professor Rickett describes Thomas J's approach as one which "looks upwards to a loosely 
defined standard of morality, and carries with it dangers of uncertainty, inconsistency and confusion": 
above n 10, 600. Compare however to Strange v ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd Unreported, 11 
October 1994, HC Wellington, CP 716/89, where McGechan J appeared to approach unjust enrichment as 
though a cause of action in its own right see above n 75, 404. 
If a situation fits within an established category, the inference is that liability is sllict. 
Hence, it is unnecessary to prove 'unjustness' on the facts. Indeed, the uncertainties 
surrounding such an inquiry make it positively undesirable. 191 In Birk's terminology, the 
vitiating factor which gives rise to unjust enriclunent in the knowing receipt case is the 
ignorance of the plaintiff, who reasonably expects the trustee to hold property for his or 
her benefit Accordingly, enriclunent is unjust '"by reason of the plaintiff's being wholly 
unaware of a transfer from himself to the defendant." 192 
B The Beginnings of Strict Liability? 
I The foundation for strict liability 
The House of Lord's decision in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltc/93 has injected vitality 
into the claim that equitable and legal receipt based claims should be synthesized into an 
all encompassing strict liability restitution action. There are two critical aspects of the 
decision. 
Firstly, their Lordships recognized a general principle of restitution for unjust enrichmen 
In the case before their Lordships, it was manifested in the strict liability action for mom 
had and received. Secondly, their Lordships endorsed a defence of change of position/ 
which would mitigate the harshness of strict liability. 
In El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings, 195 Millett J observed thai knowing receipt was 11the 
counterpart in equity of the common law action for money had and received." Both are 
receipt-based restitution claims, imposing a personal liability to account for the full value 
received. However, the House of Lords dealt with the common law action only, and 1m 
thus left the comparable equitable rules in the realm of speculation. 
The logical argument is that the same rules should govern both the legal and equitable 
claims:196 
19 1 See P Birks "English Recognition ofUnjust Enrichment" [1991] LMCLQ 486, 487: the inquiry into 
unjustness " carmot be allowed to degenerate into an intuitive application of the judge' s perceptions of 
justice." 
192 Above n 185, 296. 
193 [1991] 2 AC 548. 
194 The change of position defence has now been recognized in New Zealand: Martin v Pont [ 1993] 2 
NZLR23. 
195 Above n 65, 736. 
196 Above n 65, 739. 
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I do not see how it would be possible to develop any logical and coherent system of 
restitution if there were different requirements in respect of knowledge for the common law 
claim for money had and received, the personal claim for an account in equity against a 
knowing recipient and the equitable proprietary claim. 
If fault remains an essential requirement of liability under equitable rules for knowing 
receipt, there will be an obvious inconsistency with the analogous rules at common law. 
In practice, a plaintiff could face a more difficult path to recovery depending on slight 
variations in the facts. 197 
Indeed, the House of Lords seemed to have a coalition of equity and law in 
contemplation, as the following ind.icates:198 
Even so, the recognition of change of position as a defence should be doubly beneficial. It 
will enable a more generous approach to be taken to the recognition of the right to 
restitution, in the knowledge that the defence is, in appropriate cases, available; and while 
recognizing the different functions of property at law and in equity, there may also in due 
course develop a more consistent approach to tracing claims, in which common defences 
are recognized as available to such claims, whether advanced in law or in equity. 
This statement illustrates the feasibility of a move towards a restitutionary liability which 
encompasses in rem and in personam receipt based claims in equity and law, no matter 
what type of property is involved. 
199 
It is therefore desirable to consider how a move to strict restitutionary liability would 
affect claims against banks which are currently dealt with under 'knowing receipt'. In 
particular, it will become increasingly important for the judiciaty to ensure that the 
defences operate to protect banks who transact in good faith. 
200 
42 
197 P Birks "Persistent Problems in Misdirected Money: A Quintet'· [1993] LMCLQ 218, 225. The 
differences are due mainly to the variations in tracing rules between law and equity. For a full discussion 
of tracing rules, seeAgip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson above n 25. 
198 Above n 193, 581. 
199 Above n 13, 18. S Gardner suggests that there is no reason why the principles in Lipkin Gonnan 
should not apply to cases where loss is to a trust. Consequently, if knowing receipt is not made strict 
subject to defences, "it will be undercut and made irrelevant anyway": above n 50, 86. 
200 Above n 75, 403. 
2 Defence of change of position 
The change of position defence is necessarily at a formative stage, with its future subject 
to uncertainty. Lord Goff was clear that "nothing should be said at this stage to inhibit 
the development of the defence on a case by case basis, in the usual way. "201 The 
essential features of the defence thus far are as follows:202 
The defendant must establish that he would suffer detriment if the plaintiff were to be 
awarded restitution; that is, restitution would leave the defendant in a worse position than 
the position he would have occupied ifhe had never received the enrichment. ... The 
defendant's detriment must also be attributable to the enrichment that he has received; that 
is, the detriment would not have occurred if the defendant had not received the enrichment. 
. .. Restitution is rejected only to the e>..ient that the defendant would otherwise suffer a net 
detriment. 
Clearly the defence is not available to a bank which has notice of the breach of trust. 
Furthetmore, money paid away in the normal course of business does not constitute a 
change of position. 203 Thus a bank will have a defence when it permits its customer to 
make further drawings on the faith of the payments received. 204 Beyond this, the situatir 
is vague. Due to the nature of banking business, the situations where it can be said that 
the bank has incurred additional expenditure on the faith of the payments received will b 
rare. Hence, the effectiveness of the defence in the banking environment will depend or 
the degree of flexibility allowed in the ne.xllS between enrichment received and 
expenditure incurred. 205 
Whether the defence will extend beyond the simple net enrichment model described 
above "must, disappointingly, be left hanging. "206 A lack of certainty as to the scope of 
the defence would pose problems for banks, who would no doubt like to be able to 
201 Above n 193,580. 
202 p Key "Change of Position" ( 1995) 58 MLR 505,507. 
203 This was anticipated by Millett J - "It is no defence, for example, ifhe spent money on ordinary livir\ 
expenses; there must have been some extraordiruuy expenditure which he would not have incurred if he 
had not received the money": above n 2, 82. 
204 Strange v ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd above n 190. 
205 It has been suggested that if the change of position defence is applied in too strict a manner, it will bi 
"too refined for the realities of life": above n 50, 87. 
206 Above n 191,489. Birks goes on to consider some possible paths of development, as does P Key in 
above n 202 . Such discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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organize their procedures in a way to minimize the potential costs of a strict liability 
regune. 
3 Bonafide purchaser for value 
An interesting feature of Professor Birk's original thesis is that his argument is based on 
authority.207 Accordingly, those cases which allow constructive notice to fix liability for 
knowing receipt support his contention that liability is strict subject to a defence of 
purchase without notice. Any confusion has been caused by the courts' reluctance lo 
distinguish between fault necessary to found liability and fault which eliminates the 
application of the defence. 
44 
When receiving into an overdrawn account, the bank is a purchaser for value. 2°
8 
Accordingly, if it does not have notice of the breach of trust, the bank may treat the funds 
as its own. The defence of purchaser for value is better suited to the nature of banking 
business than the change of position defence. Money received in good faith into an 
overdrawn account would be usable for ordinary business purposes, without the 
disruption of having to unexpectedly account to a deprived beneficiary at a later date. 
This can be compared to the change of position defence, where the bank would probably 
need to show the money received was paid away outside the ordinary course of business, 
on faith of the payment received. 
Recently, Professor Birks has departed from his 01i.ginal position, and questioned whether 
a defence of purchaser for value is sustainable. m Lord Goff clearly thought it was, and 
distinguished it from the change of position defence by saying that the court is not 
concerned with adequacy of consideration in the purchaser for value analysis.
210 
Professor Birks queries this, and suggests it makes no sense to allow a defence to a 
restitution claim simply because the defendant is a purchaser. To Birks, the true 
relevance of the purchaser rule is the value that has been given. 
211 Thus, "it may come to 
207 C Harpllln states that the article was "more notable for the excellence of its ideas than for its use of 
precedent": above n 13, 24 
208 Above n 40; above n 190. 
209 Above n 191. 
210 Above n 193. 
211 Above n 191, 490-491. 
be recognized that the defence of bona fide purchaser for value is simply the paradigm 
change of position defence. "212 Ultimately, the position may be as follows:213 
[E]quity will not permit a defendant to set up a title to property in which the plaintiff has a 
beneficial interest unless he has given value or otherwise changed his position to his 
detriment without notice, actual or constructive, of the plaintiffs interest 
It remains to be seen how the new defence of change of position will ultimately relate to 
other defences. In the commercial environment, the security in wealth which provides n 
foundation for an individwil's business must be protected.214 As argued above, a bank's 
interests are best catered for if something akin to the purchaser for value defence is 
preserved within the overall framework of defences. 
4 The fate of knowledge 
Whatever approach is taken to the applicable defences, the good faith of the defendant 
remains a central factor. Accordingly, the issues surrounding knowledge and notice will 
not conveniently disappear. 
In Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale, their Lordships did not stipulate a degree of knowledge 
which would invalidate a defence. Furthermore, the argument for treating knowing 
receipt as a st1ict liability "seems to contain no message as to this question". 215 However 
it can be observed that those cases which suggest knowing receipt is equivalent to the 
action for money had and received, lean toward a standard of constmctive notice.216 
Constructive notice is seemingly better suited than dishonesty to the property protection 
regime of unjust enrichment, as the conscience of the recipient is not in issue. 
Accordingly, a bank would be denied a defence if it failed to make reasonable inquiries 
into the source of funds received. The principles of notice in commercial dealings 
discussed earlier would determine when inq~ was required.1.17 
212 Above n 2, 82. 
213 Above n 2, 82 . 
214 Above n 50, 89. 
215 Above n 50, 90. 
216 Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson above n 25; El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Ltd above n 65. 
217 See text at above n 65. 
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C The Implications for Banking Practice 
In the pursuit of an orderly framework for equitable liability, the practical implications of 
change must not be ignored. Hence the following waming:
218 
Unless and until the law clarifies what are its purposes when imposing liability on third 
parties who become implicated in fiduciary wrongdoing, ordering from within is apt simply 
to perpetuate the arbitrariness and ambiguity which presently besets the law. 
A recurring theme of this article has been to stress the peculiar position of banks due to 
their roles as intermediaries. The case law has evolved to take account of this. Central to 
the principles of banking law is the rule from Foley v Hill. 219 A bank is not a trnstee. 
This was expanded in Thomson v Clydesdale Bank Ltd.
220 A bank is not concerned with 
the source from which its customer has derived funds. These cases clearly establish that 
if a bank acts in good faith, it is entitled to treat funds received and dealt with as the 
absolute property of the customer. Banking practice would become excessively difficult 
if these principles were ignored, and a bank was required to make inquiries on a regular 
basis. These rules are subject to equity's requirement that a bank cannot always shelter 
behind its walls to avoid liability as constructive trnstee. As illustrated earlier, the precise 
nature and scope of a bank's liability as recipient is far from settled. 
Hence, it is logical to inquire whether a change to the preferred position of the 
restitutionists will offer greater certainty for banks, without violating the established 
banking law principles. If the scope and nature of a bank's liability can be defined with 
more precision, then banks can cany out their operations accordingly. At present, "there 
are no clear guidelines as to what standard of conduct will obviate the risk. "
221 
In short, the preferred position is stti.ct liability, subject to a defence of change of position. 
The defence would not be available if the defendant has constructive notice of the breach 
of trust.222 This seems to preserve something akin to the current situation. A bank has a 
valid defence if money was received without notice of the breach of trust. There will 
simply be a shift in the burden of proof. 
218 Above n 1, 208. 
219 Above n 5. 
220 Above n 40. 
221 M Halliwell "The Stranger as a Constructive Trustee Revisited" [ 1989] Conv & Prop 328, 334. 
222 See above n 13, 24-25. 
However, there are difficulties hidden beneath the simplicity of this position. It should I 
remembered that the concept of notice is merely incidental to the tlue purpose of the 
change of position defence. The primary concern is to prevent restitution when its 
imposition would be inequitable, due to a subsequent change in the economic position 0 
the defendant. The defendant 's state of mind is not of concern, as liability is strict. 
Indeed, the "innocent recipient of a mistaken payment has no defence grounded in his 
innocence. There is no defence of innocent receipt simpliciter. ,,m Notice is only 
relevant to whether the defendant changed position in good faith. 
Thus, if the bank's customer is a trustee or fiduciary, then the bank also becomes truste: 
upon receipt of trust funds. If a breach of trust is corrunitted, not only is the trustee 
strictly liable, but so is the bank once it receives those funds. The established banking 
principles would be under serious threat. Accordingly, the operation of the change of 
position defence would be crucial to banking practice. However, in its current form, th; 
defence would be of limited value to banks. 
A defence of bona tide purchaser without notice would greatly assist. This is better sui1 
to the situation where a bank receives funds into an overdrawn account. The defence 
would be even more effective if notice was taken to mean dishonesty. However, issues 
such as these remain unresolved. These loose ends will need to be tied if knowing recci 
moves to strict liability. The efficiency of banking business depends upon it. 
The best solution is to define with more rigour exactly when the bank is a recipient. TI 
essence of unjust enrichment is that the defendant retains property for his or her own 
benefit. Hence, a defence of "ministerial receipt"124 could be implemented. It would Ix 
accepted that "payment received in the ordinary course of business is not a per~onal 
benefit to the banker which he is liable i.'l equity to restore to the equitable owner. "225 
Furthermore, "there must probably be some conscious appropriation of the sum paid in: 
the account in reduction of the overdraft. "226 
If the bank's liability as recipient was confined to when it actively pursued its own 
interest, then many of the concerns as to how a strict liability regime would affect norm 
banking transactions would be eliminated. If payments were received in the ordinary 
course of business, the bank would be treated as an accessory to the breach of trust, an1 
would therefore escape liability if it acted without dishonesty. 
223 Aboven 191 , 491. 
224 Above n 185, 303. 
225 Above n 24, 82. 
226 Above n 2, 83 (fn 46). 
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So, a move to strict liability for knowing receipt may be logica~ and may bring it into line 
with its common law equivalent, but it will not easily eliminate the uncertainty which 
knowing receipt liability currently presents to banks and other intermediaries. 
VII CONCLUSION 
The explosion of case law and academic commentary on strangers as constructive trustees 
in the last decade has been invaluable. The principles and concepts underlying liability 
have been more clearly articulated, which has paved the way for increased certainty in the 
specific rules. However, there are gaps left to be filled, especially when considering the 
application of the rules to banks. 
The elements of liability for accessory liability have been finalised following the Privy 
Council's advice in Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan. However, it remains to be seen how 
the dishonesty requirement will be developed in future cases, and in particular, how it will 
be applied to banks. 
On the other hand, the circumstances which must exist before a bank can be made liable 
as a recipient remain controversial. At present, there are no clear guidelines for a bank to 
follow. The Court of Appeal must pronounce with clarity the rationale for liability 
before the detailed rules can be established with certainty. The principal focus should be 
to develop the rules in a manner which takes into account the demands of banking 
practice. 
The future is the concern. It would seem that the Barnes v Addy jurisprudence could be 
relegated to a mere historical anomaly. Indeed, it has been suggested that Lipkin Gorman 
v Karpnale is now the only relevant authority, with restitution being the true basis for 
recipient liability.227 Amidst this enthusiasm for a move to strict liability, the present role 
of fault should not be lost sight of The requirement of fault protects commercial dealers 
who act in good faith, and recognizes that coµunercial transactions should not be unduly 
impeded by the demands of equity. This is especially important in the case of 
intermediaries, who occupy a position at the heart of commercial dealings. Any 
restrictions placed upon their business will be felt by the commercial sector as a whole. 
Whatever the future may hold for recipient liability, the pursuit of a principled and logical 
legal approach must incorporate these important policy considerations, so that the 
227 Above n 13, 25. 
efficient flow of an intermediary's daily transactions can be presetved. In short, it shouJ 
be ensured that unreasonable risks are not imposed upon banks who transact in good 
faith. 
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